



**STRATEGY  
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**SHOULD ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FORCE STRUCTURE BE  
BASED ON THE FEDERAL WARFIGHT MISSION OR THE  
EMERGING HOME LAND SECURITY MISSION?**

**BY**

**COLONEL THOMAS E. SCHUURMANS**  
United States Army National Guard

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**COLONEL THOMAS E. SCHUURMANS**  
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Michael Pearson  
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Thomas E. Schuurmans, COL  
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Historically the force structure of the Army National Guard is determined by the federal warfight mission. This concept allows for a single training base for all components including soldier, leader, and equipment training allowing for easy integration of active and reserve forces. After the September 11th attacks, a new military priority emerged; Home Land Security (HLS). Army involvement in this mission is not yet determined but could be significant. Should the National Guard be tasked with and structured for this mission? Does this HLS mission require restructuring? Are the tasks so new and different that our soldiers are unable to accomplish them as currently structured? Would restructuring eliminate all or part of the National Guard combat structure? Does the active component possess enough combat power to meet all feasible global scenarios without a strategic reserve? Can the Army, active and/or National Guard, complete this mission without restructuring? Current projections indicate that the HLS tasks do not dramatically differ from current global Army operations (OOTW, etc.). The National Guard can perform this HLS mission with the current structure serving the state during peace and the nation during war. These are general-purpose soldiers who can meet short term special purpose needs.

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## **SHOULD ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FORCE STRUCTURE BE BASED ON THE FEDERAL WARFIGHT MISSION OR THE EMERGING HOME LAND SECURITY MISSION?**

Should Army National Guard force structure be based on the federal warfight mission of the US Army or on the emerging Home Land Security mission? This important question must be answered and addressed. It will have wide reaching impacts on the future military, civil, and multi-agency approach to protecting our sovereign territory and our national interests. How we base the capabilities we need from our military and assess the future threat home and abroad is key to the future of our armed services.

Today's world is very volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. The political and nonpolitical influences that shape our world environment range from radical Islamist fundamentalism, ethnic factionalism, to peaceful democracies. State sponsored or supported terrorism is a constant destabilizing factor.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of all forms is rampant. New technologies and many cash starved nations willing to sell information and technology have removed many of the obstacles to acquiring these weapons. A demonstrated eagerness to acquire and willingness to use these weapons is now becoming more prevalent.

As the sole remaining global superpower, how should the United States structure its' military to defend our territory and our vital interests at home and around the world against these threats? Once all other national elements of power are exhausted and the decision to use military power is made, the United States must have a robust, capable, and responsive force. This force must be able to effectively operate across the full spectrum of combat operations. There must exist enough force structure, material, and political/public will to decisively engage in numerous locations simultaneously to set conditions favorable to the United States and our allies.

This type of force is extremely expensive to maintain. One way to ensure that we field a force that possesses the required capabilities without potentially bankrupting the national treasury is through a robust and capable reserve component.

For this reserve component to be relevant, viable, and usable it must be able to integrate with, and compliment, the active component. Integration of the reserve component with the active component (or AC/RC integration) is a challenging task. Many programs exist to assist in this endeavor such as Integrated Divisions, Teaming, Bosnia Task Force, Multi-component Units, and command exchange programs. Two of the key tenants of this effort are having the same structure baseline with like units having like equipment and with soldiers trained to lead and execute regardless of component. The military must also have established baselines for

the type missions each unit must be able to accomplish, again regardless of component. No component should be structured for one mission and one mission only.

Homeland defense, homeland security, and consequence response are missions that take on a whole new emphasis in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. It was clearly demonstrated that the United States is not prepared to defend our territory against an asymmetric terrorist threat. Who has responsibility for these missions is yet to be determined but we can assume that the US Army (AC/RC) will have at least a piece of it. The missions of homeland defense, homeland security, and consequence response are important and complicated as many different agencies are, or will be, involved here in the United States.

Are these potential important missions very much different from what our military currently executes at home (such as support of disaster relief from tornados, hurricanes, floods, and fires), or around the world (KFOR, SFOR, etc.)? Are these tasks beyond the capabilities of our current and future soldiers? Are these tasks that our soldiers and leaders can adapt to with minimal training? Can it be accomplished by general purpose soldiers with special purpose training? Regardless of who is tasked for this Home Land Security mission, should we restructure that part or all of our military to support this mission?

Almost every domestic mission that the military is tasked with is multi-component and multi-agency. In most cases the military is only a supporting agency to the lead civilian authority. The legal issues involved with the military performing law enforcement missions on US citizens as well as collecting intelligence on those same citizens are restrictive.

Arguably, the National Guard is best suited for this domestic mission role as they live and work in over 4000 communities nation-wide and have a community based knowledge that includes local geography and urban terrain. They are part of the community infrastructure and maintain a close relationship with civilian agencies, law enforcement agencies, and other emergency responders, county by county, state by state, across the nation.

The National Guard is also routinely used to assist in world wide operations. The Army Reserve is also being called upon to support numerous deployments, but is more limited than the National Guard in domestic missions due to the legal restrictions found in Title 10 US Code. The depth of requirements increased as the warfighting plans began to require Reserve Component units for all significant operations, some even prior to deployment of forces, and for augmentation during daily operations. This component integration improved the Army's ability to absorb new missions as the breadth of the requirements increased to include engagement activities and now some homeland security missions.<sup>1</sup>

The National Guard of each state and territory has an Adjutant General assigned to lead the Army and Air National Guard within their borders during peacetime. This leader is basically a civilian (state) employee that wears a military uniform (Army or Air Force) and works directly for the Governor. The State Adjutant General is by design a multi-agency individual (state employee responsible for federal assets) and in at least 22 states is also responsible to the Governor for state emergency management.

Should the National Guard military force structure be changed to better support the homeland security and consequence response mission? Should the domestic homeland security mission be the primary basis for the Force Structure of the National Guard? Should the National Guard force structure remain based upon Department of Defense warfight requirements? Should this domestic mission become the primary mission for the National Guard or remain as an "On Order" task as they focus on the war fight fulfilling their historic dual-purpose role?

Structuring our military to meet the current threat is a daunting challenge under the best of circumstances. In today's global environment, it is probably more difficult than ever before. Our military is being called to perform new missions that expand the breadth of its capabilities as the United States remains globally engaged as the sole remaining super power. Striking the right balance between threat, mission, resources, and components must be completed as we prepare for an uncertain future.

## **DISCUSSION:**

The missions given to today's Army are much different than they were 20, or even 10 years ago. We routinely see the Army being deployed in support of everything from Peace Making/Peace Keeping, Disaster Relief, to fighting forest fires. While we are engaged in this type mission, there will likely be no reduction in other deployments that the Army is tasked with related to deterrence, transformation, and world-wide engagement. These deployments are certainly important, but hardly what our combat troops are trained for.

In addition, the threat to our nation is much different today than it was before. We must now consider asymmetrical threats here within CONUS as well as with our deployed troops. Defending the United States, or Homeland Defense and Homeland Security, is a strategic mission for the Army and has the highest priority of the US Military<sup>2</sup>. This "Homeland Defense" mission is not yet totally defined but we are deploying our assets against it anyway. Potentially everything from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Nuclear, Biological, & Chemical (NBC), infrastructure protection, to natural disasters are included.

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive list of definitions to assist in planning for future operations. As the span and scope of these definitions and the missions they will generate are conceived, a "draft" definition has emerged (for the purposes of this monograph, this is the definition that will be used).

*Homeland Security.* Protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure at home by deterring against, and mitigating the effects of all threats to US sovereignty; supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.<sup>3</sup>

Such a definition avoids dividing national security into "domestic" and "overseas" concerns and thereby helps preserve unity of effort in the execution of the national security and national military strategies. Second, it assists in reducing the potentially disruptive impact if an incident in which it is not clear whether hostile intent is involved by enabling the creation of a single chain of command appropriate for either situation. Finally, it facilitates the establishment of priorities and the allocation of resources.<sup>4</sup>

The draft Home Land Security Strategic Planning Guidance also described the following missions or mission areas:

- *Land Defense.* The Army objective under land defense is to be prepared to participate as part of the joint force executing plans for the defense of the United States and its territories.
- *Responding to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incidents.* The Army Objective in responding to CBRNE incidents is to organize, equip, and train units to timely, effectively and efficiently support the Lead Federal Agency in its efforts to: (1) reduce the vulnerabilities to CBRNE incidents; and (2) manage the consequences of CBRNE incidents.
- *National Missile Defense (NMD).* In the near-to-mid term the Army's objective is to perform those actions necessary to ensure the successful testing, deployment and operation of a land-based NMD system. The purpose of the NMD system as currently envisioned is to provide protection against limited ballistic missile attacks targeted at the United States. The Army's Operational Concept for NMD can be found in TRADOC PAM 525-82.
- *Combating Terrorism.* The Army Objective under Combating Terrorism is to provide training, staffing, and equipment resources and services to support domestic emergencies consistent with national security priorities, Federal Response Plan Criteria, and US Code dealing with employment of military forces within the United States.

- *Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)*. Protecting and defending critical infrastructure, including information and information systems. Army support will likely consist of equipment and forces to prevent loss of, or to assist in restoring, telecommunications, electric power, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water, emergency services, and government continuity. The Army objective under CIP is to develop a capability to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of those assets deemed critical to the United States.
- *Information Operations (IO)*. The Army objective under IO is to provide information operations in support of HLS efforts. Information operations are defined as defensive and offensive operations taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. While there are situations where a retaliatory IO strike directed at an external entity might be undertaken to stop an ongoing attack, the general expectation is that HLS IO missions will be defensive in nature
- *Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA)*. The Army objective under MACA is to provide essential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities. MACA includes all of the actions that can be taken under disaster-related Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).

To begin to plan for these missions, it becomes obvious that a military force today must be able to leverage full utilization out of every asset and resource that it possesses. We must be able to maximize our investment in personnel and equipment in all components of this service and ensure complimentary integration. The active and reserve components should achieve a "symbiosis" where a cooperative and complimentary relationship would exist. This could maximize the investment and the advantages, as well as minimize the disadvantages, of all components. The military can not afford to squander any of the precious resources that it controls.

"We are the Army – totally integrated into a oneness of purpose – no longer the Total Army, no longer the One Army. We are the Army, and we will march into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century as the Army. We acknowledge the components and their varying organization strengths. We will work to structure the Army accordingly."<sup>5</sup> The Reserve Component structure of the US Army could potentially be better integrated and utilized with force structure mirroring the active component. Integration efforts will be better served if choosing roles and missions that segregate the force are avoided.<sup>6</sup>

What should the Army National Guard's structure be based on? Today's Army National Guard contains 34% of the total force structure of the Army (56% of the combat forces, 40% of the combat support, and 34% of the combat service support). This includes eight combat

divisions, fifteen separate combat brigades (referred to as enhanced separate brigades, eSB's), and two Special Forces Groups. The Army National Guard also maintains a presence in over 2600 communities nation-wide with facilities that range from a single small armory to full up military installations.<sup>7</sup> This force is usually equipped with modern equipment and is well imbedded within all 54 states and territories.

While each combat organization has its own assigned commander and staff, the National Guard forces that fall within each state and territory have another peace-time headquarters. Command of the National Guard when not in active federal service is vested with the Governors of the States. The Governors exercise command through The Adjutant General.<sup>8</sup>

The Adjutant General, the leader of the Army and Air National Guard within each state and territory, is not an active duty soldier but a state employee working directly for each respective Governor. By virtue of this status, this ensures that the National Guard has a conduit to all other state agencies and is by default "multi-agency". This routine relationship is very important when other agencies are overwhelmed and the Guard is called until civil assets can handle the event. This relationship is improved even more in at least 22 states where the Adjutant General is also in charge of the state Emergency Management Agency. This pays incredible dividends in unity of command during any sort of event where public safety is at risk.<sup>9</sup> Whether the threat is a snowstorm, a flood, a tornado or a terrorist, the command lines must be made clean by consolidating and centralizing many functions and different agencies. This ensures a very complimentary symbiotic multi-agency relationship that capitalizes on capabilities and demands effective use of resources.

There are structural barriers, or friction, and misunderstanding between the active component and the reserve component, specifically with the National Guard. This issue goes beyond the full-time versus part-time argument, it includes structure and equipment as well<sup>10</sup>. It is accepted that the active component soldiers work full-time, train an average of 240 days a year, socially cocoon themselves on military posts, and make up less than half the Army force. Guard and Reserve soldiers normally work part-time, two days a month, train for an average of 39 days a year, are socially rooted in civilian communities where they hold civilian jobs, and command over 54 percent of the Army. The mistrust is caused by numerous other factors. Application of readiness standards, relevant force structure battles, and National Guard political power are some of the irritants.<sup>11</sup>

A main issue that might relieve this friction goes to relevancy and respectability. The reserve components want to have force structure that is relevant to the active component and the Army, and they want to be respected for their capabilities and unique contributions. Just as

important, they do not want to be the active component. All components have their own identity and culture but share more than just the same uniform. A desire to serve and be an integrated part of the Army while complimenting strengths and minimizing weaknesses is a worthy goal.<sup>12</sup>

The unique military status that the National Guard enjoys under Title 32 USC and/or State Active Duty gives some advantages to executing a domestic mission. Exploiting the advantages of these statuses could possibly go along way to gaining additional relevancy and respectability for the National Guard. Title 32 is a federal status that allows for peacetime control by the state or territory and federal control when congress determines they are needed.<sup>13</sup> State Active Duty (SAD) is a state status that does not involve federal funds, only state funds, for pay and federal equipment usage expenses.<sup>14</sup>

The National Guard can be more responsive and in the process more relevant because they require only the Governor's declaration authorizing activation, are normally restricted only by state law, and are usually based locally with equipment and infrastructure. The Active Military however, are subject to the restriction of what is called the "Posse Comitatus Act". "Whoever except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the constitution or act of congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both."<sup>15</sup>

As a consequence of "Posse Comitatus", the active forces can only be called for domestic missions that may involve law enforcement implications after a federal declaration by the president. Under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1984 (referred to as The Stafford Act), active forces may be used for disaster relief missions. These narrowly defined missions, authorized by a presidential declaration, must be for a limited duration and only until such time as civil authority can resume responsibility.<sup>16</sup> The Stafford Act also allows for federal reimbursement of state funds used to respond to a disaster, including all National Guard expenses while on State Active Duty (soldier's pay and allowances and all federal equipment usage expenses).

The National Guard wants respect for the unique abilities that they possess, their deeply rooted civilian ties and their military capabilities. The flexibility that their different statuses allow could compliment many different domestic operations if properly understood and employed. The National Guard desires force structure relevant to the federal warfight. They must be able to integrate or blend with the active component to support the National Military Strategy globally if required.

The 388,000 citizen soldiers of the Army National Guard<sup>17</sup> are very capable and represent the strategic reserve of our combat forces. A significant portion of the Army combat support and combat service support units reside in the National Guard as well. This force structure basically mirrors the active component, which is primarily organized, focused and structured for conducting sustained combat overseas, currently for two simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) major theater wars.<sup>18</sup>

The combat service and combat service support structure within the National Guard is a key part of the Army. This structure routinely deploys with the active component. In fact, the National Guard has participated in virtually every Army or Air operation since the Persian Gulf. Even minor contingencies, CTC rotations, and training involve the routine use of two or more Army components.<sup>19</sup>

The reserve component's combat structure, which is almost completely in the National Guard, has been a recent target for budget cutters. The Army National Guard (ARNG) Division Redesign Study (ADRS) is an effort to make up the shortfall in required CS/CSS units while preserving active component combat power. From the results of this study, two National Guard Combat Divisions will convert to CS and CSS structure by the end of FY-09.<sup>20</sup> Citing readiness concerns and no war-fight mission, the National Guard Divisions became a prime target in our resource constrained environment.<sup>21</sup>

Increasingly, the Army is calling on these National Guard combat soldiers to fill OCONUS deployment missions all over the globe. Army National Guard (ARNG) Division Headquarters have commanded the stabilization force in Bosnia and ARNG combat units are also serving (or have served) in Southwest Asia, Europe, Balkans, Central America, Korea, Egypt, and most any other place active combat soldiers are.

On September 2, 1999, William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, chartered the US Commission on National Security.<sup>22</sup> This commission was directed to accomplish five things:

1. Conduct a comprehensive review of the 21<sup>st</sup> century global security environment, including likely trends and potential "wild cards".
2. Develop a comprehensive overview of American strategic interests and objectives for the security environment we will likely encounter in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
3. Delineate a national security strategy appropriate to that environment and the nation's character.
4. Identify a range of alternatives to implement the national security strategy, by defining the security goals for American society, and by describing the internal and external policy instruments required to apply American resources in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

5. Develop a detailed plan to implement the range of alternatives by describing the sequence of measures necessary to attain the national security strategy, to include recommending concomitant changes to the national security apparatus as necessary.

In response to Secretary Cohen's charter, the US Commission on National Security published a response recommending a focus on the following areas: Securing the National Homeland, Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education, Institutional Redesign, The Human Requirements for National Security, and the Role of Congress.<sup>23</sup>

Recommendation #6 under Securing the National Homeland States: "The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be organized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission."<sup>24</sup>

In addition, Senator Dianne Feinstein has drafted a bill for consideration in the Senate of the United States: "Guard Act of 2001" which proposes to amend title 32 USC to designate homeland defense as a primary mission of the National Guard.<sup>25</sup> It dictates that significant restructuring should take place to support this Home Land Security mission.

This movement toward mission specialization for the Reserve Component is nothing new. A recent example is the development of one piece of force structure to meet a need that simply did not exist anywhere else. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass destruction Act of 1996<sup>26</sup> advocated the training of first responders to deal with a Weapon of Mass destruction incident. This legislation also required DoD to develop a plan to integrate the National Guard and Reserve forces in consequence management. The plan that was issued in January of 1998 stated that the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve must be ready "to train local authorities in chemical and biological weapons detection, defense, and decontamination; assist in casualty treatment and evacuation; quarantine, if necessary, affected areas and people; and assist in restoration of infrastructure and service."<sup>27</sup>

As a fallout of this legislation, DoD created within the Army National Guard twenty-seven (initially seventeen expanded to twenty seven) Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams. These teams (now called Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams or WMD-CST's) assist local and state authorities. They do this by assessing a suspected nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological event in support of the incident commander (IC), advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions, and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and federal assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate reduction of property damage.<sup>28</sup>

What does this movement to specialization mean? It might be a further indication of the misunderstanding of the historic dual-mission of the National Guard; serving the state in peace, the nation in war. More importantly, what are the second and third order effects of such a movement?

If the National Guard is "specialized, missioned, and structured" for homeland security, the assumption can only be that a warfighting structure is not appropriate for Homeland Security and that the National Guard is no longer needed for the warfighting mission.<sup>29</sup> Apparently the thinking is that the tasks and duties associated with the Home Land Security mission are so dramatically different from what soldiers and leaders are currently trained to perform that they would be currently unable to perform them. Another logical assumption would then be that the active component has sufficient warfighting forces to meet all feasible scenarios from multiple Small Scale Contingencies to Major Theater Wars.

The Army that fought and won Desert Storm is long gone. The current Army is really too small to fight a major land war against a state like Iraq without even more coalition landpower augmentation than it received in the Gulf War.<sup>30</sup> Eliminating National Guard warfight units would certainly mean accepting risk by eliminating the strategic combat reserve.

The size and structure of the National Guard is determined by force requirements for federal missions. The National Guard soldiers receive the same training on the same equipment as the active component (which allows for a single training base). Structured to meet federal requirements, the National Guard has successfully responded to state emergencies, under Governor control, fulfilling its dual-mission mandate.

This brings up a couple of discussion points that should be explored:

- Will the existing force structure of a state be reduced by federal deployments to the point they cannot fulfill the dual mission mandate? A study by RAND found that between 1987 and 1993, no single activation of the Guard required more than 6 percent of its total personnel.<sup>31</sup>
- What tasks will the National Guard be expected to accomplish as part of this mission? Neither the commission, nor anyone else, has identified any tasks associated with this mission that are beyond the ability of current forces. These are flexible, adaptable, general purpose troops with experience dealing with local issues.

There should be little concern among the Governors that they will not have sufficient resources available to respond to potential emergencies within their state due to federal deployments of their National Guard. Should a situation arise where the Governor does not have sufficient resources to respond to an emergency, assets from another state could help out.

This resource sharing is facilitated through interstate mutual aid agreements, or Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) between states.<sup>32</sup> These agreements can be further enhanced through standing regional alliances such as the Western Governors Association. This organization and their respective states have agreed to "State Ratification of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact to Allow Interstate Military Support for Disaster Response", signed June 15, 1999.<sup>33</sup> To date no missions have been identified that would be beyond the capability the states individually or jointly possess until civil authority can resume control.

As directed in Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39)<sup>34</sup>, the Department of Defense (DOD) will activate technical operations capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts of NBC or WMD terrorism. As required under the Constitution and laws of the United States, DOD will coordinate military operations within the United States with appropriate civilian lead agencies for technical operations.<sup>35</sup> Responding to an incident or to a temporary civil shortfall in capability is expected, even required, but should not generate a change in structure.

Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) is a newly-established joint task force assigned to US Joint Forces Command that provides command and control over Department of Defense forces in support of a lead federal agency. Specifically, its mission is: To support the United States military and civil authorities in a time of crisis following a weapon of mass destruction incident.<sup>36</sup> This headquarters has accumulated the best information available to develop some "playbooks" to estimate what force structure would be needed to respond to certain events: nuclear, chemical, or high yield explosive.<sup>37</sup>

These playbooks offer flexible response appropriate to the event as they are developed in packages or task forces. The expected type of units to respond to a given event are: four infantry battalions, military police battalion, engineer battalion, civil support battalion, chemical battalion, aviation (UH-60) battalion, area support medical battalion, transportation, maintenance, and communications units. Potentially on call will be Air Force assets to evacuate casualties across the country as in this type event local medical assets will be immediately overwhelmed. No documented requirement was found for force structure that does not already exist.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

The National Guard is an important link in a unique American tradition tracing its lineage back to the colonial militia in 1636.<sup>38</sup> For 365 years this citizen soldier concept has provided a means of defense that assisted defending this country from all enemies at home and abroad.

This community-based organization was designed to band together to repel any homeland threats. This allowed for a small standing Army to be filled by the citizen soldier in times of need. The roles that evolved from this "active" and "reserve components" concept were basically unchanged: the regulars bore the first onslaught of a conflict and provided the continuity of professionalism necessary to mold and mobilize citizen forces. Those massed citizen forces then fought and won the Nation's wars. Between wars, the Regular Army was reduced in size and most citizen soldiers gave up any military status.<sup>39</sup> As the importance of a robust reserve component grew, so did the training and technical skills required to be part of the modern Army. Today's reserve component soldiers attend the same schools and receive the same training as the active component soldiers. They work hard and accomplish much in the limited time they have. The reserve component is not designed to replace the active component, just enhance it.

Whatever the mission and structure of the Army National Guard evolves to, it must be a relevant and integrated part of the total force, the one Army, the Army. It will be very hard to maintain any sort of relevancy if the National Guard force structure is based on anything but the federal warfight. Integration between the components is challenging under the best of circumstance even with the same training and equipment. Understanding the differences between the active and National Guard statuses and the capabilities and legal issues they represent, is enough a challenge without mixing in different structure and training. Barriers already exist between the components causing friction and mistrust, further separation won't help. Understandably, there is resistance to field any specialized or unique structure by the National Guard. This stems from a long standing fear that when the RC is assigned special roles, these are roles that the active forces do not want or value.<sup>40</sup>

Today, the Army National Guard is still a community-based organization ready to respond locally to serve community and state, or globally when needed, to support our national interests. But it retains a community focus that lends well to the homeland security mission. There are over 2600 deployment platforms in the shape of community armories and local training installations that the National Guard can base out of or support missions from. It retains very close ties with local law enforcement agencies as well as local, state, and federal emergency management departments. The National Guard is the military that most of the civilian community identifies with. Most US citizens rarely see an active duty soldier in person, usually only on television. They have many more opportunities to see reserve component soldiers. These are the soldiers that they see working in the communities, wearing the uniform, and supporting them in times of need.

The Guard retains flexibility under title 32 US Code, under the command of the Governor in peacetime, able to be federalized in times of need. State Active Duty provides even more flexibility as the governor has resources, restricted only by state law, that can respond locally or regionally when the need arises. These different statuses allow for effective support of domestic as well as federal missions. Again, a good understanding of the advantages and limitations of these different National Guard statuses could certainly assist in complimentary employment of different components for a domestic mission.

The National Guard can become a more equal partner in our nation's defense strategy if allowed to continue to perform strategic missions OCONUS as well as within CONUS, allowing active component forces to focus on the first to fight mission. The issue is: should the mission the National Guard is structured, trained, and equipped for stay based on the federal warfight mission or some specialized security mission, primarily focused on defense of the homeland.

I recommend that the force structure of the Army National Guard continue to be based on US Army federal warfight requirements. This will allow our nation to get the most out its' investment in the reserve component and still retain a flexible force that can meet the demands of our nation, supporting our national objectives, across the full spectrum of operations at home and abroad.

A previous Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, stated:

"...Although the Army's essence rests in its war-fighting ability, it has a doctrine flexible and versatile enough to adapt effectively to other kinds of missions, such as disaster relief. In case of disaster relief, the Army doesn't need, as some have suggested, to create units specifically structured, trained and equipped for disaster relief. If anything, the recent operations demonstrate that our combat units possess enormous adaptive capability-fueled by a doctrine emphasizing flexibility and versatility, efficiency, decisiveness, and creativity, as well as the necessary equipment and supplies, to conduct disaster operations."<sup>41</sup>

There is risk in primarily focusing our military, or a segment/component of our military purely on a domestic security mission. Diverting the military from its original purpose of combat will certainly, over time, degrade those skills needed to fight and win our nation's wars. "The military should be used as a stop-gap, not as a permanent or regular solution to a (domestic) problem. Requiring the problem to be beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities forces the military to stay out of matters that can otherwise be handled by the proper authorities and will encourage the development of those authorities' capabilities to deal with chronic, nonemergency problems."<sup>42</sup>

Military analyst Harry Summers wrote of the Canadian military that when militaries lose sight of their purpose, catastrophe can result: "Instead of using the peacetime interregnum to

hone their military skills, senior military officers sought out civilian missions to justify their existence. When war came they were woefully unprepared. Instead of protecting their soldiers' lives, they led them to their deaths. In today's post-cold war environment, this trap again looms large. . . . Some today within the US military are also searching for relevance, with doctrinal manuals giving touchy-feely prewar and postwar civil operations equal weight with warfighting. This is an insidious mistake."<sup>43</sup>

The general purpose soldiers in the National Guard can meet the short term special purpose needs that arise. These community based soldiers and units currently possess the same knowledge and training base than those of the active component. Time and again these soldiers have proven that they are flexible and adaptive enough to successfully execute short term missions that they were not necessarily intended for. These combat, combat support, and combat service support soldiers have domestically responded and successfully provided support for disaster relief (floods, tornados, hurricanes, blizzards, etc.), fire fighting, civil disturbances, and currently infrastructure protection. All these mission are intended to be short-term missions, only conducted until the crisis is over and civil authority can resume control. The National Guard successfully conducts this type of mission almost everyday somewhere in the 54 states and territories. The National Guard also supports global engagement missions, currently commanding the Bosnia stabilization force mission with a Division Headquarters.

The National Guard is an entity with two missions. It is structured to support the federal warfight while integrated with all components, and is allowed to support our states and territories in times of peace. It has done this for 365 years and will continue to do so. The primary mission of the National Guard is to be prepared to assist in fighting and winning our nations wars. These soldiers and units represent a cost effective way to maintain a significant combat reserve while supporting our country in many "non-combat" ways conducting day to day operations. There is no need to sacrifice the strategic combat reserve of the US Army to structure a force that really isn't needed.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense "Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study", 1999, pp 3

<sup>2</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense "Quadrennial Defense Review Report", September 30, 2001, pp 18

<sup>3</sup> "Home Land Security (HLS): Strategic Planning Guidance" (Draft dated Jan. 8, 2001)

<sup>4</sup> LTC Antulio Echevarria II "The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective," Strategic Studies Institute, March 2001 pp7

<sup>5</sup> General Eric K. Shinseki, CSA, "Intent of the Chief of Staff," 23 June 1999

<sup>6</sup> LTC Dallas D. Owens, "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge", Strategic Studies Institute, pp 48

<sup>7</sup> US Army War College: 2001 "How the Army Runs, 2001-2002" pp 7-3

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, pp 7-17

<sup>9</sup> MG (RET) Gerald Sajer, "Homeland Security: A Strategy for the States," pp 4

<sup>10</sup> LTC Dallas D. Owens, "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge," Strategic Studies Institute, pp 37

<sup>11</sup> David Fautua, "How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025," Parameters, Spring 1999, pp 1

<sup>12</sup> LTC Dallas D. Owens, "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge," Strategic Studies Institute, pp 9

<sup>13</sup> US Army War College: 2001 "How The Army Runs, 2001-2002" pp 7-5

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp 7-25

<sup>15</sup> Posse Comitatus Act, US Code, section 1385, title 18.

<sup>16</sup> The Public Health and Welfare, US Code Title 42, Chapter 68, Disaster Relief

<sup>17</sup> US Army War College: 2001 "How the Army Runs, 2001-2002" pp 7-5

<sup>18</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense "Quadrennial Defense Review Report", 30 September 2001, pp 18

<sup>19</sup> LTC Dallas D. Owens, "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge," Strategic Studies Institute, pp2

<sup>20</sup> US Army War College: 2001 "How The Army Runs, 2001-2002" pp 7-28

<sup>21</sup> Congressional Budget Office Study: Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, December 1997, pp 28

<sup>22</sup> Charter of the US Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, Appendix 2, pp 130

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> SEN Dianne Feinstein Draft Bill: "Guard Act of 2001," December 13, 2001

<sup>26</sup> US Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Subtitle A: Domestic Preparedness (GPO, 1996). Also known as Nunn-Lugar II.

<sup>27</sup> US Department of Defense, The Department of Defense Plan for Integrating the National Guard and Reserve Components Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass destruction (GPO, 1998)

<sup>28</sup> Xavier Stewart, LTC, PhD, 3<sup>rd</sup> Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, November 2001. Cited with permission of LTC Stewart.

<sup>29</sup> LTC Dallas D. Owens, "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge," Strategic Studies Institute, pp39

<sup>30</sup> Dr Conrad Crane, "Maintaining Strategic Balance While Fighting Terrorism."

<sup>31</sup> Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, RAND, 1995

<sup>32</sup> Public Law, 104-321, Approved by Congress in 1996.

<sup>33</sup> Western Governor's Association, "Policy Resolution 99-022," June 15, 1999, available from [www.westgov.org/wga/policy/99/99022.htm](http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/99/99022.htm) Internet; accessed 2 April 2002.

<sup>34</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 39, "United States Policy on Counterterrorism." June 1995

<sup>35</sup> FEMA Federal Response Plan, Terrorism Annex, 7 February, 1997

<sup>36</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, JTF-CS web site, available from [www.acom.mil/About/com\\_jtfcs.htm](http://www.acom.mil/About/com_jtfcs.htm) accessed 2 April 2002.

<sup>37</sup> Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) J-6 Playbooks, as of January 28, 2002

<sup>38</sup> US Army War College, 2001, "How The Army Runs 2001-2002" pp 7-1

<sup>39</sup> LTC Dallas D. Owens, "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge," Strategic Studies Institute, pp 4

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp 40

<sup>41</sup> General Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA, "Hurricane Andrew: An After Action Report," Army, Vol. 43, No. 1, January 1993, p 20

<sup>42</sup> "The Posse Comitatus Act, a Principle in Need of Renewal" Washington University Law Quarterly, Summer 1997

<sup>43</sup> Harry Sommers, "When Armies Lose Sight of their Purpose," Washington Times, 26 December 1991



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